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PENNY WHITE: The previous sessions have focused on
the effects of insufficient resources on the Sixth
Amendment'sl promise. This session is somewhat different
as it will focus on other impediments to the delivery of
effective assistance of counsel, specifically, impediments to
counsel in capital cases that raise not only legal issues but
ethical issues.
The panel format will also be different. The panel
will discuss hypothetical cases that are strikingly similar to
cases that happen every day. These hypotheticals will be
posed first to a panel of experienced criminal defense and
capital lawyers, and then hopefully we'll have time to open
it up for discussion.
Each panelist will speak primarily to one
hypothetical, which I will introduce to you, and then we'll
have some interaction between the panelists before moving
on to the next hypothetical. At the end, we will engage in
your discussion, comments or questions.
Let me describe the materials for this session. On
the flash drive are three articles that our panelists thought
would be helpful to you as you look at these issues in
greater depth. They include Larry Fox's article in the
Hofstra Law Review on capital guidelines;2 Sean O'Brien's
article in the same, volume 36, of the Hofstra Law Review
on supplemental guidelines for the mitigation function;
3
and Brad MacLean, Bill Redick and Shane Truett's article
Pretend Justice on death penalty representation in
Tennessee, which is in volume 38 of the Memphis Law
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Lawrence Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually
Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 775, (2008).
3 Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693 (2008).
3
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Review.
4
All three of those articles are on your flash drive.
But to make it a little easier to follow along and participate
in this particular session, we also have a handout. The
handout includes a copy of the hypotheticals, the
PowerPoint slides and then some additional resources that
are listed on the slides that are pertinent to the individual
hypotheticals. So that's what you will have in front of you.
Also, we have copied in total some of the most pertinent
provisions from the ABA Guidelines5 and two ethics
opinions from Tennessee.
So as we begin the discussion, we'll hear a lot of our
panelists undoubtedly referring to the ABA Guidelines6 and
on the slide, which is in front of you and also in your
handout, is the link to those guidelines. The ones that we
will be most frequently referring to, 10.5, 10.7, 10.11 and
10.13, 7 are in your handout, either completely or partially,
the relevant parts. And as I mentioned, there are two
Tennessee ethics opinions that may be helpful to Tennessee
lawyers in your handouts.
Let me then begin by introducing our panelists very
briefly because you have the bios of three of our panelists
in your biographical material. Our panelists will draw upon
their own personal experiences, but also upon excellent,
excellent resources that they will make you familiar with
and that will be on the slides.
First, we are honored to have with us, in
alphabetical order, Mary Ann Green, who is Assistant
Public Defender from Hamilton County, which for those of
4 William P. Redick, Jr., Bradley A. MacLeanm & M. Shane Truett,
Pretend Justice: Defense Representation in Tennessee Death Penalty
Cases, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 303 (2008).
5 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
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you who aren't Tennesseans, is Chattanooga. Second,
Bradley A. MacLean, who is with the Office of the Post-
Conviction Defender in Nashville, Tennessee. Then we
have Sean O'Brien, who is a Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City in Kansas City,
Missouri. And I have to give special thanks to Ann Short-
Bowers, who is a lawyer in Knoxville with the Bosch Law
Firm. She is neither Larry Fox, who had an emergency, nor
David Dow who had an emergency, but she has graciously
agreed to come on less than 24 hours notice and help us
out. So please first join me in thanking our panelists.
Our first hypothetical is about formulating trial
strategy. The situation is this: The client is charged with
capital murder. You, as counsel, discuss with the client
your plan to interview the client's mother. The client says,
"Absolutely not, you are not to bother my mother about any
of this. She has suffered enough. I am directing you not to
contact her under any circumstances." The client is
competent and does not change his or her mind even after
extensive explanation.
And we pose the question to Professor O'Brien,
"How do you proceed?"
SEAN O'BRIEN: Thank you. This is the familiar "don't
be talking to my momma" hypothetical. It involves ethical
rules pertaining lawyer-client relationships and making
weighty decisions about life and death. I had a client on
death row tell me this story. It is in bad taste, I'll tell you
in advance. That's never stopped me before from telling a
story. But there were these two guys on death row in
Texas, both scheduled to be executed on the same night,
and the warden is giving them their final requests.
And so the warden says to the first guy, "I'll give
you one request before we execute you." And he says,
207
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"You know, I'd like to hear 'ACHY BREAKY HEART ' 8 one
more time." And the warden says, "You got it." He turns
to the second guy and says, "Do you have any last
requests?" And the guy says, "Yeah, I want to go first."
The hypothetical makes me think of the second Star
Trek movie, the WRATH OF KAHN, 9 in which you learn that
Captain Kirk cheated on the Kobayashi Maru scenario
l °
because he doesn't believe in the no-win scenario. So in
order to pass the test, he re-writes the question. And the
part of the question here that I would rewrite is the
assumption of competence because, in my view, a
defendant facing a capital charge is very, very unlikely to
be in a position to make a competent decision to forego
mitigating evidence or to forego an appeal. So let me talk
about that from this point of view.
First of all, we have to talk about theory, right?
Because there are so many law professors in the crowd, I
feel like we at least need to give some lip service to this.
But trust me-those of us who have been doing this for a
long time-we've got this down in practice. We'll just
never work it out in theory. The standard that the ethical
code gives us is that we're supposed to let the client decide
what plea to enter, whether to waive the jury trial, whether
to testify, and that sort of thing.
The ethical standards also tell us as lawyers that we
have the right to decide what witnesses to call and whether
8 BILLY RAY CYRUS, ACHY BREAKY HEART (PolyGram/iMercury
1992).
9 STAR TREK Il: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).
10 The Kobyashi Maru scenario was a test at Starfleet Academy
involving a simulation in which the cadet, acting as a starship captain,
was surrounded by hostile ships while responding to a distress call
from the Kobyashi Maru, a stranded freighter. There was no way out;
the purpose of the exercise was to determine how the cadet would
respond to the no-win scenario. James T. Kirk does not believe in the
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and how to cross-examine those witnesses and what
motions to make. All tactical and strategic decisions are
the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with
the client. And so that's the premise from which I begin to
work this out in practice.
The other premise though, comes from the
Constitution. And the standard in death penalty cases is
fully-informed decision making in matters of life and
death.' And that goes not just for the decision of the
judge, the decision of the jury, and the decision of the
prosecutor about whether to seek the death penalty, but it's
also the client's role to make fully-informed decisions
about what evidence to present. How can the client know
what evidence you might present in mitigation if we have
been barred from talking to his or her mother prior to even
getting to this stage? So that's the second point.
The other thing the ABA Guidelines give us in
Guideline 10.7,12 the commentary is particularly important:
That we have an obligation not only under the Constitution
but under the ethical guidelines, to conduct a thorough and
independent investigation as to both guilt and penalty. And
that obligation exists regardless of any statement by the
client that evidence bearing on penalty is not to be collected
or presented. 13 That's an important provision of the Ethical
Guidelines.
The other critically important aspect of the Ethical
i "[W]here sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been
agreed that the [sentencer's] 'possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics' is '[h]ighly
relevant-if not essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate
sentence."' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1977) (quoting
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)) (alterations in
original).
12 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7 (2003).
13 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7(A) (2003).
7
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Guidelines is our duty as lawyers to make every
appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust. The
client telling you that you're not to talk to his or her mother
is a sign of distrust. There's a problem in the attorney-
client relationship. There's an absence of rapport and
likely even a lack of understanding on the client's part
about your need to be communicating with members of the
client's family. The Guideline recommends very strongly
that you see your client within twenty-four hours of
appointment and that you engage in a continuing and
interactive dialogue with the client.'
4
This is very important in the context of today's
discussion because the defender system is in financial
crisis; attorney-client communication is the first casualty of
an overloaded public defender's office. You don't see your
client as often as you should. You don't talk to your client
as often as you should. And when you finally do get there
to talk to your client, what do you talk about? Why haven't
you been here to talk to me? And that creates a barrier in
that relationship. And so this is incredibly important that
we keep that thought in mind.
Ethical Consideration, 7-8.15 A lawyer should exert
his best efforts to ensure decisions of the client are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations. Again, how can you fulfill your ethical
obligation to your client if you haven't interviewed the
client's entire family?
The other aspect of our obligation as lawyers
regarding mitigation and guilt/innocence investigation is
that we have to understand, the client is not the only person
who has a stake in the outcome. Generally, as a society we
have things in place to stop people from committing
14 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.5 (2003).
15 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 7-8 (2003).
210
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suicide. If you're the guy standing there on the ledge next
to the fellow who's thinking about jumping, only in a bad
Mel Gibson movie do you say "Go ahead." And if you do,
you only do it as a strategy to get him to stop.
The other aspect of this decision has to do with the
context of capital litigation. We must understand as capital
litigators that these decisions are made in the context of
extreme trauma. Not just trauma from the capital crime,
the arrest, the incarceration, but also the trauma of the
child's past. And quite often when the client tells me that
he or she does not want me to talk to certain witnesses or
interview momma, that tells me that momma knows
something that I need to know. That heightens my desire to
go talk to that witness because it is likely that this person is
trying to hide trauma from me. 
16
What's one of the classic symptoms of trauma?
Avoidance. Avoidance of triggers that cause you to re-
experience the trauma. 17 And yet, we all know from death
penalty litigation, that it is the trauma that the client has
suffered that is most likely to evoke sympathy and
understanding on the part of the capital decision-maker that
will save his or her life.
So we have to proceed from the understanding that
there are barriers between us and the mitigation case. And
some of those barriers include the shame and
embarrassment and humiliation of having been raised in an
impoverished, abusive household. They're not proud of
that. And they don't want that paraded in front of the jury
or a court, especially not if it's a high publicity, high-
16 A competent mitigation investigation will invade dark, shameful
family secrets; it "exposes raw nerves, re-traumatizes, scratches at the
scars nearest the client's heart." Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in
Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 35-36.
17 For an excellent discussion of trauma issues in capital cases, see
Kathy Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Througout
Capital Mitigation Invesigations and Presentations, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 923 (2008).
9
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profile case.'8
There may be concerns about the consequences.
Are my other children going to be taken away from me?
Maybe they don't understand why it is you want to know
this. They don't understand why this is a critical part of his
or her life history. There may be some race and class and
social barriers. Most of us in the capital defense
community who are doing this are white while many of our
clients are people of color. And so we have a lot of other
kinds of barriers to get over.
But the most significant barrier I have found in
these cases is the desire of the client to one day have a
normal relationship with the parent, with the abuser-the
idealizing of the abuser. There's a really cruel experiment
that they did with monkeys sometime ago where they put
needles under the fur of a surrogate mother figure and then
an artificial breast from which the baby monkey would
seek nourishment. And in spite of the fact that it was
physically painful for those baby monkeys to snuggle up to
their mother while they were eating, they never stopped
trying.19 And those are our clients. Those are our clients in
these cases.
And so we have to proceed with the understanding
that the things that we're going to investigate will expose
these raw nerves and re-traumatize and as Russ Stetler says,
"Scratch at the scars that are nearest to the client's heart."
20
And the answer is not to avoid it and not to cave in to the
client's natural tendency to stay away from those things,
but to counsel the client through it by this process of
18 See John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases:
Principles of Developing and Presenting Mental Health Evidence in
Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 63-65.
19 See The Adoption History Project, Harry Harlow: Monkey Love
Experiments,
http://www.uoregon.edu/-adoption/studies/fHarlowMLE.htm.
20 Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE
CHAMPION, Feb. 23, 1999, at 5.
212
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constant engagement.
This is the American Medical Association's model
of suicide prevention and interventions. 21 And you could
not do a better job of diagramming the stresses that a death
penalty defendant is under when facing a capital charge.
You look at suicidal behavior, and there are two things that
start it.
The first is stressful life event, and I think being a
defendant in capital case qualifies. Does anybody disagree
with that? The second is a mood or psychiatric disorder.
How many of you have ever had a capital client who didn't
have that going on? So in the beginning, you have the
formula, and then you get the perfect storm here-the
suicidal ideation, the thinking about life or death-and
we're forced to engage our clients about that thought
process. They're going to try to kill you. Huh, let me think
about that.
Then we get to the specific factors that feed into
suicidal behavior. Impulsivity. Gee, I've never had an
impulsive client, how about you? Hopelessness and/or
pessimism. How often do you see that as your client is
starting to absorb the weight of the state's case and the
massive resources that are being devoted to seek to end his
or her life? If that doesn't make a normal person hopeless,
I don't know what will.
Access to lethal means. Well, these are your tax
dollars at work. The whole idea behind capital litigation is
to provide the lethal means. And then imitation. Imitation.
Who are they imitating? Governors, senators,
congressmen, prosecutors, maybe even other people on
death row. And then all of those add up to a suicidal act.
Then you look in the blue section on the right, the
21 A graphic depiction of the Suicide Risk Assessment Model discussed
here is available online at Mark A. Zamorski, Report of the Canadian
Forces Expert Panel on Suicide Prevention,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/health-sante/ps/dh-sd/spr-rps-eng.asp.
11
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prevention. Interventions and education awareness
programs. Do you have any of those in your county jails?
Screening individuals for high risk. How good is the
county jail at that? Pharmacological therapy, medication.
Most of our clients are not getting the medication they
need. Psychotherapy. That never happens in jails, not on a
meaningful level-follow-up care for suicide attempts.
None of the treatments intended to ameliorate suicidal
impulses or behaviors exist on a meaningful level in our
client's lives.
One thing I learned about investigating suicide is
that if there is one suicide attempt in a person's life, one in
ten of those people who have had one suicide attempt
eventually will succeed in committing suicide. And so how
many of our clients have suicide attempts in their past?
Virtually all. I reject the basic premise that this is a
voluntary, competent decision. This is my definition that I
found in the Youth Suicide Prevention Program website:
"Suicide is not chosen. It happens when pain exceeds the
resources for coping with pain."22  I think that's a
significant factor in dealing with all of these decisions.
Pain exceeds the resources for coping with pain. And it is
our public defender systems in this context that provide the
resources for coping with pain. It is our job as capital
defense attorneys to keep the client on board and moving
forward.
I actually have John McCain on my side. You
know, he's an angry guy, and I have discovered it's not just
because he's a Republican. I realized this when I read
some comments that he made on the Anti-torture
legislation. "Solitary confinement is an awful thing. It
crushes your spirit, weakens your resistance, more
effectively than any other form of mistreatment." This is a
22 Youth Suicide Prevention Program, Resources, YSPP Suicide




7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 215
guy who had an arm broken twice and a broken leg during
interrogation, and he says the worst was solitary. And that
is all of our clients on death row, all of our clients in pre-
trial detention. I don't have to tell you we have more
people in jail getting mental health treatment than we do in
our hospitals getting mental health treatment right now. I
won't dwell on it because of the materials on your thumb
drive-but the Hofstra Law Review has some amazing
articles about this very subject and about the mitigation
function.
And finally, this is my argument that I'm right
about this. This is Joe Amrine. I have had the "don't talk
to my momma" discussion with him. In the last year of his
appeals, he had no stay of execution along with ten other
guys who are backed up behind a particular legal issue.
The first Tuesday of every month he watched an inmate
parade by his cell in the company of guards taken off to the
death watch cell and executed at midnight that night. And
there were ten guys waiting a year for their turn.
And after eight, he called me up and said, "I want to
go next." It had nothing to do with ACHY BREAKY
23HEART, trust me. But he was so damaged emotionally
and so ready to get out of there that he would do anything.
We eventually succeeded. Rather than getting an execution
warrant, he got a briefing schedule. We proved his
innocence and this is the day of his release from prison.24
So don't assume guilt from the fact that your client wants
to volunteer to be executed, or to avoid mitigating evidence
in the penalty stage of the capital trial. So this is my
Exhibit One, Joe Amrine. Thank you.
23 CYRUS, supra note 7.
24 See Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en bane)
(granting Joe Amrine habeas corpus relief and ordering his release from
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PENNY WHITE: All right. Facilitator's prerogative,
Sean. We all know that the courts won't agree with our
evaluation of our client's competence. So I'm taking you
back to the question. There's been a competency
determination and your client is declared competent. Your
client says, "Don't talk to momma." Is your short answer
"talk to momma" and competency?
SEAN O'BRIEN: My short answer is "talk to momma,"
because competency doesn't resolve it. There's also
knowing and voluntary and intelligent decision-making on
the part of the client. And you can be competent but not be
making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision. So
client engagement is my answer to that.
PENNY WHITE: The caption under this next question is
one law professor tries to take on another. Your client
knowingly, voluntarily and freely says, "Don't talk to
momma." Do you tell the public defenders in the audience
"talk to momma?"
SEAN O'BRIEN: You know, it's sort of like-[Telephone
rings.]
PENNY WHITE: Momma's calling.
SEAN O'BRIEN: There's momma. There's momma.
PENNY WHITE: She called me. I didn't call her.
SEAN O'BRIEN: You know, hopefully, and-and I'm
going to sidestep your question again-
PENNY WHITE: I know that.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Because that's my prerogative, right?
216
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And so, you know, if this happens on day one of your
representation, you've got a problem. You've got a barrier
to work over, and you'd better work through it with your
client. And you're going to have the time to do that. So
you've got something to work on.
There is a wonderful book by Xavier Amador
25
called, I AM NOT SICK. He advocates engagement with
somebody who has mental illness or emotional stressors in
his life, and he uses the acronym LEAP, which is Listen,
Empathize, Agree and Plan. You have to hear out the
client. You have to listen to what's going on. You have to
show that you empathize with the client's situation. You
have to agree on an approach. And you have to develop a
plan. And you have to do that together. Because the reality
is this: If the client says I don't want you to talk to my
mother, and you say, "Screw you, I'm going to see her
tonight," you're going to lose that client.
PENNY WHITE: That's right.
SEAN O'BRIEN: And so, you know, what I'm saying is
that I don't lightly disobey the client, but I will continually
work on the process of engaging the client and engaging
the client's family. So that when that conversation does
happen, I might even plausibly be able to say to the client,
"Hey, I want you to know that I talked to your mother last
night."
PENNY WHITE: So you're going to see fairly quickly that
our next two hypotheticals are related but they are
somewhat different. I'll ask Brad, Mary Ann, and Ann if
they have anything they want to say in response to Sean
before we move ahead.




7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 218
BRADLEY MACLEAN: Well, I want to make one
comment. I want to follow-up on a lot of what Sean said.
But the ABA Guidelines are very clear. They impose on
defense counsel the absolute obligation to conduct a
thorough mitigation investigation whatever the client's
wishes may be. So if you are going to comply with the
guidelines, you conduct the investigation.
PENNY WHITE: You see on the overhead the Guideline
that Brad's referring to, 10.7,26 that speaks to that. Mary
Ann?
MARY ANN GREEN: And I would just reinforce Brad's
comments. So as a public defender, who has handled
capital cases, absolutely, you talk to the mother.
PENNY WHITE: Ann, anything on this one?
ANN SHORT-BOWERS: [Shakes no.]
PENNY WHITE: So let's go turn then to our second
scenario, somewhat related but a bit different. Here the
client has been convicted of first-degree murder. The State
has rested its case on penalty. You are preparing to begin
your case. You've done your homework. You've
conducted your investigation. But at the point that you are
about to begin your case, the client instructs you to call no
witnesses and to offer no evidence in mitigation. Mary
Ann, how do you proceed? Not that you've been there and
done that.
MARY ANN GREEN: No. I even have the t-shirt and
scars to show it. Absolutely it is ineffective assistance of
26 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOITNMENT AND
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counsel at that point to simply agree with your client.
Period. There is no question and there is no footnote. It is
ineffective assistance at that point. What you can do-and
what the Tennessee cases hopefully are teaching us to do
even though the law in Tennessee is that your client has the
right to direct his own destiny and has the right to forego
mitigation, that is the law. However, I would offer some
guidance hopefully for someone caught in that position as I
was and looking around for what do I do now.
First, ask for a continuance. I agree completely
with Sean about the competency issue. Whether the client
has been deemed competent by the State's experts, your
experts, your co-counsel, whoever, there is a competency
issue at that point. And you are asking for the continuance
to discuss the matter with the client. But what you're
actually doing is asking for some time to muster your
resources-to muster your experts to figure out how to
address this issue.
Number one, why is the client doing this? You
have to determine that. You can't determine that unless
you've done all the things that Sean was talking about
earlier in terms of establishing that relationship with the
client. You cannot determine what's driving the train at
that point. And the one thing that you want to know is
whether it's because he thinks he's going to be
embarrassed. Is it because he doesn't want his relatives
involved? Is it because he doesn't want embarrassing facts
about his past to come out or about his relative's past? You
want to know what's driving the train.
Unfortunately, what drives the train for so many of
them seems to be so and so, who has experience because
he's a death row inmate, and he came back to the county
jail on a post-conviction-he told me I had that right and it
seemed like a good idea to me. They have actual
delusional ideas about the criminal justice system. One of
them is, that if they don't let you present mitigating
219
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evidence then the jury will think that they are more
innocent. Or somehow the jury will find that they made a
mistake in the first place and they'll go back and take away
the guilt finding. That's an actual delusional understanding
of the criminal justice system.
Another one is "if I don't let you put on mitigating
evidence, then I will automatically get the death penalty.
And if I automatically get the death penalty, I'll wind up
with the best attorneys. I'll get the best attorneys. I'll get
two attorneys instead of one attorney on my appeal and on
my post-conviction and on my federal hab. And not only
will I get that, but I'll get services." And in Tennessee,
that's the law. They will get services on a death penalty
post-conviction case. They will not get services on a non-
death post-conviction case. But they think somehow that's
going to give them a second bite at the apple of actual
innocence and of walking out. But they are proceeding
with some very warped ideas about the criminal justice
system. The only thing that I can suggest in terms of
counterbalancing that is again the relationship that you
establish with your client.
Listen more than you talk. Listen to what your
client is telling you. Listen to what the client's significant
others are telling you. Identify very, very early who the
significant others are in your client's life. Is it clergy? Is it
wife? Husband? Children? Nieces? Nephews? Mothers?
Dads? Little old lady next door? Who is the significant
other in your client's life? And establish just as close a
relationship with that significant other as you do with the
client. And again, listen more than you talk. Listen to
what these people are trying to tell you.
When you establish a relationship, a new
relationship with someone, like a friend, you would hope
that you get to know each other. You get to know their
characteristics. You get to know the mutual likes and
dislikes and then you determine, hey, this person could be a
220
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friend. I'm not saying you have to be the best buddy of
your client, who is accused of a capital offense, but I am
saying that if you listen more than you talk, you will get to
know your client.
When you get to know you client, there will be an
establishment of trust. Trust will be established. And at
that point, you can begin to educate your client, educate
your client about why certain things need to be done that
the client may not have thought of. And if you just went in
at the very first meeting and said we're going to be talking
to your mother, your daddy, your grandmother, your
granddaddy and all your brothers and sisters. And he's
going, "Whoa." Well, if you don't establish that
relationship, if you don't establish that trust, then you're
behind in the game.
The other thing that you want to do is to enlist the
help. In this hypothetical, your client's just been found
guilty. You're getting ready to start sentencing, and the
client says no mitigation. Your experts have evaluated this
client on basically an objective basis. They are not there to
treat the client. They are there to evaluate the client and to
give you assistance in building your case for mitigation.
But your experts are still experts. They're still
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers. They're still
experts. Bring in your team. Bring in your team of experts
and see if they have ideas about, number one, why he's
doing this? Number two, what we can do to combat it?
Then ask the court for a competency evaluation. At the
very least, it's going to build a record. But don't just go in
and say, "Your Honor, my client says he doesn't want
mitigation, and he's been sitting there during trial acting
like a perfectly nice, good, ordinary citizen. And I'm not
sure why he might be not competent, but we need a
competency evaluation."
You're not going to get a competency evaluation on
that. Go in with your facts and your documents in hand.
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Go in prepared to make an offer of proof if nothing else.
Go in prepared with the medical records, the mental health
records, the mental health reports, and your social history.
One thing that I would suggest is that from your very first
meeting with your client, begin a behavioral time line.
On day one, even if it is just a few descriptive
words, describe your client's demeanor. Describe his
attitude. Describe whether he's getting at that point any
assistance from mental health professionals in the jail in
terms of treatment, medication. Keep up with his treatment
and medication throughout the process. I don't know how
it is with your jail. But the jail in Hamilton County-
unless we have the HIPAA 27 release and a really good
relationship with the jail, our client may be on all kinds of
medication, and we wouldn't know it. So you have to ask
for these records.
And it's an ongoing process because they don't
really recognize that if they change medications, or if the
doctor comes in and changes a diagnosis, that they have to
let us know if we got the records two months ago. But
keep a behavioral time line, so that when you go in front of
the judge and you say we need a competency evaluation,
you can show the judge with that behavioral time line how
your client's behavior has disintegrated over a period of
time.
Also make an offer of proof. Try to present lay
witnesses and expert witnesses on the issue of your request
for a competency hearing. You've got the witnesses there
anyway. They're there to start the mitigation part of this
case. The lay witnesses who have been visiting him,
whether it be clergy or family or friends-visiting him
throughout his incarceration-can testify to those things
that are in your behavioral time line.
It corroborates exactly what you're time line is
27 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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saying. The expert witnesses can testify as to any
underlying mental illness or mental defect that the client
has. Recognize that the standard for competency in
Tennessee is the Dusky28 Standard as adopted by Macke29
Those both say that the defendant must have a rational as
well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against
him, and that he must be able to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings in order to consult with his
counsel and to assist in preparing his defense.
Understand also, that when someone is sent for a
competency evaluation in Tennessee, the McGarry
Instrument is the one most often used. There are thirteen
points in the McGarry Instrument. And they were
recognized in State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427,30 a 1988
case. And in that case, the McGarry thirteen points were
set out: Ability to appraise and apprise legal defenses
available; level of unmanageable behavior; quality of
relating to attorney; ability to plan strategy-that's a novel
idea-; ability to appraise the role of various participants in
the courtroom proceedings; understanding of courtroom
proceedings; appreciation of the charges; appreciation of
the range and nature of possible penalties; ability to judge
likely outcomes-well, if his idea of the outcome by not
putting on mitigation evidence is that he's going to get
better lawyers and he's going to get services and therefore,
he's going to get off death row, this is not realistic-;
capacity to disclose to attorney available pertinent facts
surrounding the defense; capacity to challenge prosecution
witnesses realistically; capacity to testify relevantly; and
manifestation of self-serving versus self-defeating
behaviors. That's something that should be in your
behavior time line.
If the client continues in his request, and the court
28 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
29 Mackey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
30 State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
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allows the sentencing hearing to proceed without the
competency evaluation, again, go back and request a more
thorough examination, on the record, of the client's
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to
present mitigating evidence. Let me repeat that. If the
court proceeds without a competency evaluation, then go
back and request a more thorough examination, on the
record, of his knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.
In the Kiser31 case, which is cited in your material,
the colloquy between the judge and the defendant takes up
about I think seventeen to eighteen lines.32 That's what it
took for this man to say "I don't want any mitigation. I
want to get the death penalty." If you enter a plea of guilty
on a shoplifting case in Hamilton County, you have to fill
out this form, which is five pages long. You have to read it
to your defendant. You have to not only read it to the
defendant, the defendant has to be able to knowingly
answer the judge's questions during the plea. Ladies and
gentlemen, it's ridiculous to allow the courts to proceed
with a mitigation waiver that takes seventeen or eighteen
lines on a death penalty case, when it takes five pages to
enter a plea on a shoplifting case. I'm getting the bad
looks, so, I'm sorry.
Finally, the last thing that I would suggest-I'm
skipping over some of this-but the last thing that I would
suggest is at any rate, submit under seal your entire
mitigation case. Submit affidavits of your lay witnesses,
reports of your expert witnesses, your exhibits, submit
under seal the entire case into the court record. So that
hopefully-somewhere down the line-someone will be
able to look at it.
The one thing I don't want to leave out with regard
to the questions that the judges ask, at the bottom of the
plea form-this part is all about what the person is charged
31 State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227, 241 (Tenn. 2009).
32 Id. at 240.
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with. "Do you understand that you're charged with
shoplifting, and it carries one day up to eleven months and
twenty-nine days?" There should be something like this for
the mitigation waiver. The mitigation waiver should say,
"Do you understand what the mitigating facts that your
attorney would present to the court are-and actually spell
out those facts." Thank you.
PENNY WHITE: So the cases that Mary Ann referred to
are State v. Kiser33 and Zagorski v. State.34 Their citations
are on the PowerPoint slides. I handed Sean a copy of
Formal Ethics Opinion 84-F-73,35 which quotes Zagorski
while Mary Ann was speaking. He took one look at me
and said, "This is horrible." But that's the law in the State
of Tennessee. That's the part you can edit out when the
transcript is prepared if you would like.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Okay.
PENNY WHITE: And the guidelines that Mary Ann
referred to include 10.736 you've already looked at. It is
pretty clear. Counsel's duty to investigate and present
mitigating evidence is well established regardless of the
desires of the client-regardless of counsel's belief that the
investigation will prove futile. And finally, even more
specific is guideline 10.11.37 Counsel at every stage has a
continuing duty to investigate the issues bearing upon
penalty and to seek information that supports mitigation or
33 Id.
34 Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998).
35 Tenn. Bd. Of Prof.'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 84-F-73(a)
(1999).
36 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF.
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7 (2003).
37 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF.
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.11 (2003).
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rebuts the prosecution's case. This includes discussing the
procedures with the client-maintaining a consistent theme
throughout both phases of the case-in determining
whether the client will testify and what evidence will be
used in the defense case.
So our next hypothetical, carrying along with this
same theme, is post-sentencing strategy. Now we're at the
appellate level. The status of this case is the post-
conviction appeal of the state death-sentenced inmate. The
direct appeals have been completed. Counsel is explaining
the next steps with regard to post-conviction appeals to the
client. And the client-maybe based on some of these
conversations Mary Ann so aptly pointed out-says, "This
is just not a life worth living. I don't want to live if I can't
be free. No more lawyers. No more appeals. I'm ready to
die. Don't file anything. If you do, I'll tell the judge you
are doing it against my wishes." So the hard question is
what to do when you are asked to abandon appeals. Brad?
BRADLEY MACLEAN: Let me start off by saying that if
that is the situation that you're confronted with in post-
conviction in Tennessee, you really don't have a serious
ethical dilemma because in order to file a post-conviction
petition in Tennessee the client has got to sign the petition.
It has to be a verified petition. And so the situation that
you run up against is a client who refuses to sign the
petition.
Once the petition is signed, you do have situations
where the client will seek to dismiss or withdraw the
petition. And often they do that by simply writing a letter
to the judge saying that that's what they want to do. And
so once that happens the die is cast, and what you need to
do in those circumstances is very clear. It's not an ethical
dilemma at all. In those cases, you simply raise the issue of
competency and litigate competency. You have no choice
but to do that.
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I'm going to talk about the more general issue. All
of these scenarios fall under the same general rule. In all of
these scenarios, what you have is a volunteer. You have a
client who is willing to volunteer for execution. The client
may not look at it exactly that way. The client at the trial
stage who wants to waive mitigation may not see himself or
herself as a volunteer. But, in fact, that's what he or she is.
If you successfully waive mitigation, and as a
consequence no mitigation evidence is presented at the
trial, then under Tennessee law-and I suspect it's true in
most other jurisdictions-the death penalty is mandated as
long as the prosecution proves its case and produces a
finding of the existence of aggravators that qualify the
defendant for the death penalty consideration.
I want to, first of all, raise one issue. Death is
different and we hear that a lot. And in this context, I want
to focus on two ways in which death is different, which is I
think fairly startling when you think about it. In Tennessee,
life without parole and the death penalty are the only kinds
of cases where the jury makes the sentencing decision. If a
defendant is allowed to waive mitigation, it is the only kind
of case where the defendant is given the choice-the
authority to make the sentencing decision because then the
sentencing decision is death, if the prosecution proves its
case. There is no Constitutional right-there's no right in
the law in any other area of the law-for a defendant to
choose his sentence. That's the job of the sentencer,
typically the judge. But death is different in this respect.
Secondly, in Tennessee, death is different in
particular in the case where the defendant seeks to waive
mitigation because in all other serious criminal cases in
Tennessee, before a judge can sentence a defendant, the
law requires that the judge receive a pre-sentencing report.
And if you look at the statute in Tennessee as to what must
go into a pre-sentencing report, it's basically the same kind
of information that a defense lawyer should present at
227
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sentencing in a capital case: something about the client's
history, the client's mental status and things of that sort. So
ironically, in a death case where the defendant waives
mitigation and as a consequence no mitigation is
presented-unlike any other serious criminal case in
Tennessee-for the sentencing decision is made without
any information whatsoever of that type. So death is
different in those respects.
I want to talk about the fundamental question. I had
a student who recently asked these very same kinds of
questions. She asked me these questions because she was
writing a paper for her law school class, and I had about
five minutes to e-mail her an answer. And yet I think that
the answer was as concise as I can put it-exactly how I
would respond to all of these hypotheticals. The first
response is: I will do everything I can to present a
mitigation case and in post-conviction to advocate for a life
rather than a death sentence. I will do everything that I can
in my power.
The second thing that I will always do is: I will ask
certain basic questions. And I've listed those questions-
and I'm repeating a lot of what has already been said-but
here are the questions that I would ask. The first question,
which is of paramount importance, is what is the nature of
the relationship between the client and the attorney? And
when I'm the attorney, I have to ask myself, what is the
nature of my relationship with the client because that
relationship will govern the outcome in most cases in my
view. The second question I would try to ask is what is the
nature of the client's understanding of the proceedings and
of his rights and of his position? The third question I
would ask is what is the nature of the client's capacity to
think rationally, to make a rational decision? What are his
thought processes like? The next question I would ask is
what is motivating the client?
And interestingly, the two prior questions that I
228
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raised-the client's understanding or his appreciation of his
circumstances, of his legal standing and also his capacity to
make a rational choice-those are the two tests that have to
be satisfied for a client to be competent under Rees v.
Peyton38 to waive his post-conviction remedies.
But beyond that, the question of what is motivating
a client is not typically a question that the courts ask. But
fairly recently, within the last couple of years, the
American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty made a recommendation that an
inquiry into the motivation of the client should be an
essential element in determining competency in these
situations.39
And the next question after that, that I would ask-
and this requires a lot of probing-what are the client's
beliefs? And by that I mean this: does the client believe
that imposition of the death penalty in his case is fair?
Does he think he deserves the death penalty? Does he
think--does he believe that he was treated fairly in the
process? Does the client believe that life is worth living?
Does he want to live?
Those are questions that you can never fully answer
through a superficial discussion with the client. Those
questions can be answered only after you learn about the
client and learn about the client's background. And
typically, in many of those cases, those questions can be
ascertained only with the help of professionals, mental
health professionals. So you have to get a mental health
professional involved, at the beginning.
John Blume, who is well-known in the death
penalty community as a death penalty litigator and as a
38 Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).
39 Paul M. Igasaki et al., A.B.A. Task Force on Mental Disability and
the Death Penalty, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty
and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 674 (2006).
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scholar has written prolifically in the death penalty area.
He wrote an article about volunteers on death row.40 And
he did a survey, and he found, based on his survey, that 88
percent of those inmates who have volunteered for
execution and have been executed suffer from mental
illness or a drug abuse disorder.4' Some 78 percent suffer
from a mental illness. In my experience, every client that I
have represented on death row suffers from a mental
illness.
There are two basic characteristics of every inmate
on death row. Number one, they're indigent. In Tennessee,
there's not a single inmate on death row who is not
indigent. Everyone is indigent today. Everyone on death
row today was indigent at the time of his trial. The second
characteristic which is common among death row inmates
with very few exceptions is that they are mentally or
psychologically impaired. And that's been my experience.
I want to relate to you a couple of cases that have
influenced my thinking in this area. The first case is the
case of Ron Harries. In 1984, Ron Harries was scheduled
to be executed. He was on death watch. He was scheduled
to be the first inmate to be executed in Tennessee post
Furman.42 He was a volunteer. He volunteered after his
direct appeal before state post-conviction.
Another inmate and a lawyer in Nashville filed a
petition in the federal court, a habeas corpus petition,
seeking to stop the execution. They were successful, and
then litigation ensued concerning his competency. He was
found to be both incompetent and to be acting
involuntarily. The finding of lack of voluntariness was
based upon the inhumane conditions of the prison. The
finding of incompetency was based primarily upon his
40 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, " Suicide and
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REv. 939, 962 (2005).
41 Id. at 962.
42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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diagnosis of bipolar.
Bill Redick has been mentioned already earlier
today. Bill Redick was a partner of mine. Bill Redick
represented Ron Harries at that time. Bill Redick took the
position that if this is what Ron Harries wanted to do, this
is what he should do. Fortunately, other forces prevailed.
The Judge stopped the execution and took Ron Harries off
death row. Bill Redick continued to represent Ron Harries,
and finally got his death sentence set aside. And then two
years ago, settled the case for a life sentence.
In the meantime-over the past many years that this
case has been litigated-Ron Harries changed his mind.
There were times when he wanted to volunteer, other times
when he didn't want to volunteer. I spoke with Bill just the
other day about that case. He said he learned a lesson.
When he took the position back in 1984-that Ron ought to
be allowed to volunteer-he said, "I didn't know about his
background. I didn't know about his mental illness. And I
would never, ever take that position again."
What we found-because I had gotten involved in
his case later on-and what we found was that Ron Harries
did not feel that he was fairly treated at trial. He did not
really feel deep in his heart that he wanted-that he
deserved to die. Although when he was in a state of
depression, he did feel that way. He is very happy today
that he's no longer under a sentence of death.
Another case, the Christa Pike case-Christa Pike
in post-conviction sought to drop her post-conviction case.
She was found to be competent, and having been found
competent, the court dismissed her case. It was appealed.
In the interim, she was diagnosed with bipolar. She was
treated for the first time with the proper medication. Once
she was treated, she began to think differently about her
case. She did not want to volunteer. And fortunately the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the lower Court's
decision-based upon what had happened in the interim-
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and allowed her to proceed with her post-conviction case.
I am today representing Paul Reid. Paul Reid is
floridly psychotic. If you ask him the question of why he
wants to volunteer-he's in post-conviction-he would
say, "Because I don't want to live like this on death row
anymore. Because I think I deserve, you know, that the
victims deserve this." But then when you probe more
deeply, he thinks he's innocent. And he thinks that
everything that goes on in his life is scripted by a force,
some kind of delusional force that he refers to as scientific
technology. He doesn't really believe these things, but he
knows how to say these things. And these cases have
formed my view that you should never, ever acquiesce in
your client's desire to volunteer.
I want to make one final point that is from a more
theoretical point of view. The argument for allowing an
inmate or a defendant to waive his or her rights and to
volunteer for execution is based upon an argument
concerning autonomy and dignity. You see, we have to
respect the client's autonomy to make his own decision as
long as he's competent.
Now, leaving aside the issue of whether he's
competent or not, the point that I focus on is that what
makes the death penalty truly unique is that it is the one
punishment that completely strips away a client's dignity.
That is the purpose of the sentence. A death sentence is not
about death. A death sentence is a statement to the
defendant by society that the defendant is not worthy of
membership in the human race.
Dignity is defined as intrinsic worth. So the death
penalty is designed to strip away dignity. It is paradoxical
to argue that a person should be allowed to volunteer to a
process that is designed to strip him of dignity in the name
of dignity. Also correspondingly, the whole idea of
mitigation is to demonstrate to the jury, to the sentencer,
how a defendant's autonomy, capacity of self-
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governance-which is the meaning of autonomy-has been
impaired.
That's the purpose of mitigation. And to allow a
defendant to volunteer for execution in the name of
autonomy and thereby take away the opportunity to
determine what kind of autonomy the defendant has is
contradictory. So as a policy matter, I don't think we can
consistently defend against the death penalty and at any
point in time acquiesce in the client's desire to volunteer.
Thank you.
PENNY WHITE: Brad's words are mirrored in guideline
10.5, 3 saying quite bluntly that it is ineffective assistance
of counsel to acquiesce in the client's wishes to dismiss
appeals.
We're going to change focus. But before we do,
Sean, Mary Ann, any closing brief remarks on the issue of
foregoing mitigation or abandoning appeals?
SEAN O'BRIEN: I just have one comment. I agree with
everything that Brad said. But one thing I would like to see
us as a community to get away from is the use of the word
"volunteer" because "volunteer" implies voluntary. That's
a decision. And these people pure and simple are suicides.
It is suicide. And "volunteer" kind of funnels us down a
path of analyzing the decision and maybe trying to talk the
client out of the decision and counsel him that way. When
you evaluate it as a suicide, and you actually research how
do suicide hotlines function and how do suicide counselors
function, it is totally unlike what lawyers do. And so I
would like us as a community to abandon the word
"volunteer" and start looking at what are the effective
treatment and prevention methods for suicide and bring
43 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.5 (2003).
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those resources and thought processes and strategies to bear
on our client decisions.
BRADLEY MACLEAN: I totally agree. I stand corrected.
And I will never use that term again.
PENNY WHITE: Our next scenario is one that Jerry Black
and I had a little personal experience with. But basically,
the hypothetical is posed in this way: You are the post-
conviction lawyer for the death-sentence inmate, and your
petition will include allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. So you contact former counsel, trial counsel, to
arrange to interview trial counsel, to secure the file, and to
do the things that are necessary to prepare the petition or to
amend that petition.
Former counsel tells you, "Wait a minute, I'm now
an adverse party. I turned my file over to the Attorney
General's Office, and I'm going to do everything I can to
rebut your claim that I was ineffective and to clear my good
name." Ann Short, how do you proceed?
ANN SHORT-BOWERS: I encountered that scenario
quite a few years ago, and I told Penny when she was
giving me the hypothetical, I said my short response
internally is how you proceed is to tell the attorney "screw
yOU."
Now, let me step back and let's talk on a slightly
higher level than that. And let me just get an idea here a
minute. How many people in the room have been involved
actually in death penalty work at some level? I hope
everyone who raised their hand-and for those that
didn't-understand that at any level of death penalty work
you may get involved with, you'd better have dang thick
skin. What makes it tricky also is that you still cannot for
one minute lose your compassion or your ability to identify
with your client.
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But don't ever get involved initially in a death
penalty case without understanding on the very front end
that this is going to be a long haul for you and that at some
point in time, unless your client is found not guilty, you are
going to be called ineffective-legally, constitutionally
ineffective. Not incompetent. I hate attorneys who say
you're calling me incompetent. I'm not. I'm calling you
constitutionally ineffective. In any work, in any given
circumstance, a lawyer can be constitutionally ineffective.
To bring it back a little bit to my experience and
where my reference is-many, many years ago my first
experience with death penalty work was actually doing a
post-conviction on a death penalty case, before I was ever
involved many years later in the trial of a case. And back
when I was involved in the post-conviction-back before
any standards-I mean forget about any reasonable hourly
rates, forget about any funds for experts-dignified
begging and even undignified begging was the way you
had to go about soliciting people to help you in these cases.
And I was naive to be sure, but I did not realize that
my involvement was going to last some thirteen years in
that case. A lot of that time was spent in-and I'll
emphasize everything that's been said about the attorney-
client relationship-a lot of that time was spent getting to
know that client and trying to build trust with that client
because I was the second attorney that had stepped in. And
so, whatever reservations the client had about how his case
was handled the first time, I had to overcome some of those
communication barriers to be able to work with the client.
You've got to be careful, and you've always got to
feed that relationship. And you've always got to nurture
that relationship because I'll tell you what happened to me
was-at the end of thirteen years-we had a breakdown in
our attorney-client relationship. And I ultimately had to
move to withdraw in the case, and I did.
In hindsight, that may have been a distinct
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advantage to the client because I was somewhat of an
abrasive lightening rod in the case. I wasn't very polite to
anyone involved in the court system. And shortly after I
got out of the case, the lead assistant prosecutor in the case
had gotten very, very sideways with his boss, and he quit.
He said, "I'm out of here"-not just off this case- "I am
out of this office." And what that left were new faces in
that case. And ultimately, I'm happy to say-and it was
one of the best days of my life-when I picked up the
phone and successor counsel called and said, "We settled
this case, and we settled it for a life sentence." And I was
absolutely delighted. And in fact the client's name is
Kenny Campbell. And as of April of this year, he made
parole.
That was also back many, many years ago when the
statutory criteria for how long you had to serve before you
could make parole was much less than now. But at any
rate, as I said, part of the message is, you're going to be in
this for the long haul, and you'd better have a thick skin.
And I can tell you because I see a lot of people here
from this community, too. I guarantee you-and I know
Mark will agree with me also-this community has just
finished up the fourth of a series of just horribly gruesome
capital defense cases: Channon Christian and Chris
Newsom. And I guarantee you, some of the finest
attorneys you will find anywhere in this country stepped up
to the plate and agreed to represent these people in these
cases. And I also guarantee you, every single one of them
knows-and they knew going into that case-that at some
point along the line, they're going to be sitting in a witness
chair. And they're going to be having allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel directed at them. And
they all know how they have to respond appropriately
under those circumstances.
When I mentioned the "screw you" remark, it was
because back when I was working on the case-that I
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mentioned took thirteen years-I got to the point where I
had been calling the attorney's office and kept trying to
make an appointment, and the secretary kept blowing me
off. And finally, I just said okay, you know, I've got to get
in the car, go up there, sit in the waiting room if I have to
until somebody agrees to talk to me.
I went up there. I don't know, I guess they kept me
cooling my heels for maybe an hour in the waiting room.
And of course, no one offered me coffee or anything.
That's okay too. When the attorney finally realized that he
didn't have a back door, he was going to have to come out
where I was sitting to actually be able to leave the office. I
stood up, and I introduced myself. And I told him who I
represented. And I explained, "I need some of your time,
please. And if it's not convenient now, can we please
schedule a time to sit down and talk?" And he looked at
me and he said, "Lady, it's just a question of when that
guy's going to fry," and walked out the door.
And that still is totally imprinted in my long-term
memory. That attitude just absolutely blew me away. So
when I say "screw you," that's exactly what I thought to
myself when he walked out the door. And I guarantee you,
we made the post-conviction hearing as miserable for him
as we could. And let me tell you, there was a reason for
that. Not just because of his attitude and getting some
visceral fun out of it, but because-please understand under
Stricklandn-when you're dealing with ineffective
assistance of counsel, Strickland45 tells you, you have the
burden. You're going to have to try to re-create the
circumstances that existed at the time counsel was making
certain decisions. You're going to be confronted with a
presumption that what counsel did was reasonable, unless
you can show other circumstances.
The more difficult trial counsel makes it for you,
"Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
45 Id. at 692.
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and the more you have to push back, gives you -and it
gave us ultimately-some ammunition to be able to argue,
"We were trying our damndest to carry our burden of
proof. But look what happened." I mean these attorneys
fought us every single stage tooth and nail. We ultimately
had to subpoena the file into court. And of course, they
wouldn't cooperate. "May we see your file now?" "Oh,
no." "Oh, no." They just sat and held it in their lap.
Okay. Fine. "What's the first piece of paper in
your file? Would you please take it out and identify it for
the court?" We are only talking about one little accordion
file. I mean, that's a tip off right there. You know, once
we were about a quarter of a way into the file, the judge
kind of looked at the attorney and said, "Why don't we
come back tomorrow. And in the meantime let post-
conviction counsel just photocopy your file please, and
let's see if we can't move it along," which we did.
But the point being, we did have to get into that
level of difficulty because obviously the attorney did not
appreciate the continuing duty that he owed to that client.
Having-and again-we're going to talk about some of
those duties, but let me talk a little bit more practically
about what you could do confronted with former counsel
with that kind of attitude as an initial way to deal with it.
I would suggest, first of all, look around in cases in
your community. Bob Ritchie's no longer with us. I have
asked Bob, and Bob has agreed to do this previously for
me-not in a death penalty case. Identify that one attorney
in the community that seems to have the greatest amount of
respect that you can find. Call that attorney and see if you
can enlist them. Say, "Would you call so and so, ask them
to go to lunch with you. Just would you talk to them about
what's at stake here? You know, maybe they'll listen to
you. They're not going to listen to me right now." And see
if you can't get a network going. You don't have to share
any attorney-client privilege or any confidences of your
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client to try to enlist somebody in that fashion to see if they
can soften up that attorney a little bit. That's one
suggestion.
Two is to write a letter to the attorney. And just
say, "Look, here is what your ethical obligations are. All
I'm wanting you to do is within the framework of those
obligations. Please meet with me. I have a waiver from the
client, so that you can talk to me; so that you can provide
your file to me. But here are your ethical obligations."
Now, that may help. It may not.
You get blown off again, personally-and at this
point in my career-I would probably sit down and write a
letter to the Board of Professional Responsibility. Now, is
that going to help? Probably not. Is it going to make the
situation any worse? At that point in time, I don't think it's
going to make it a bit worse. But who knows. You might
get the Board involved. You might somewhere along the
way make that attorney have a second thought as to what
he or she is doing. But if you get that far, then you
probably are going to get to a point where you're dealing
with having to subpoena the attorney to court-having
subpoenaed the files. And get prepared for it and just do it.
If you find yourself in the situation of where your
services and your level of representation have been called
into question in a death penalty case, what are your
obligations? You know, just as if the client dies, the
relationship continues. Just because your services may be
questioned, it's not free time for saying "okay, I'm no
longer bound. I no longer have any obligations to the
client. I can do what I want. I can go talk to the state. I
can provide all the material." No, that's not the situation.
Now, post-conviction counsel, if he or she is doing
the job correctly, should get a release from the client so that
that release can be presented to the attorney to say okay, it
is all right for you to provide your work product files to
post-conviction counsel. It is all right for you to discuss
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my case with post-conviction counsel-attorney-client
privileged materials, confidentiality issues, and get that
core thing done. That way, the trial attorney should feel
that he or she is protected in terms of going forward.
Just because though, that kind of waiver has been
obtained, doesn't mean that the client is saying, "Okay,
that's fine, you can go talk to anybody you want to."
That's not giving you permission to go sit down and talk
with the prosecutor that's handling the case. And I would
caution, if you are in post-conviction counsel's situation,
you need to-when you craft the release for your client-
be real careful how you craft it. And you might want to
have those caveats in there: "By this I am not consenting
that you talk to anyone else. I'm not consenting that you
can talk to the state on my behalf." Get those parameters
outlined very carefully.
Going into a death penalty case as trial counsel, you
have an ethical obligation to keep your files as well
documented and as organized as you can. Sometimes I
know they get a little messy. I worked for a long time with
a gentleman, and that's primarily what I did was clean up
his messy work-labeling files and whatnot. But you
really should-if you find your files in that situation-take
the time. And you know, if you're doing death penalty
work, you're not going to get paid for it. Get over it. You
weren't compensated fairly the first time. Don't take it out
on the client on post-conviction. Spend the time necessary
to sit down, organize your files, and find the time to
meaningfully discuss the case with post-conviction counsel.
And to the extent that the strategy is consistent with what
you know the facts to be, you should cooperate with
counsel.
What do you do if you get the call from the state,
"Hey, we got a post-conviction. We'd like you to come
over and talk about it?" I'll tell you personally, in death
penalty cases, I say, "You can find out what I've got to say
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when I get on the stand. I'm just like any old witness."
You know how we've all had them say, "I don't have to
talk to you. Don't want to talk to you. Never going to talk
to you." It's kind of how I feel about these things. Why
should they be entitled, particularly if my client has given
me some pretty good parameters as to what I am, and am
not, authorized to say? I'm not going to sit down and talk
to the State about the case.
I guess to seriously bring it around and wrap it up:
just have thick skin. Don't ever, ever take it personally if
you're trial counsel in a death penalty case. Don't ever take
it personally. Know that going in on the front end. And if
that causes you a problem, don't do the case; just don't do
it.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you very much, Annie. Just by
way of summary, the Guidelines4 6 are very specific. There
is an obligation to conduct a full examination on the part of
post-conviction counsel, an obligation of trial counsel or
any member of the defense team to safeguard the interest of
the client even after the relationship has ended, and an
obligation to cooperate with successor counsel. And the
Guidelines47 specifically refer to maintaining the records in
a manner that is conducive to use-as Annie referred to-
and to providing the files and all information regarding the
representation to successor counsel, as well as sharing
potential further areas of legal and factual research and
cooperating appropriately.
And then finally, the commentary to Guideline
10.13, 48-the last point that Annie made-says that counsel
should share not only papers but strategic thinking. All of
46 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003).
47 id.
48 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.13 (2003).
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this should be routinely and openly presented to the post-
conviction counsel. To do otherwise is unethical.
I think-because we have only about twelve
minutes left-that rather than do the last hypothetical right
now, we will turn to your questions or comments. And
then if you don't have many questions or comments, then,
we'll talk about the conflict of interest hypothetical. But
I'd like to think that there are comments for people who
take issue or want to say "Amen, Amen." Again, while
they're getting to the first comment, I want to commend our
able court reporter from Watts-Boyd who's been working
feverishly over here. So bear her in mind and speak loudly
when you get the microphone.
BARBARA HURST: I'm very mindful of the fact that you
people do this actually on the front lines. I represented
three death penalty clients in a direct appeal. The statute
was struck down and has never been re-enacted in Rhode
Island. So I feel like I'm standing in the position, "easy for
me to say."
But I hear a lot of values behind what you're saying
that seems to be personal values, about how you view life,
how you view life worth living, how you view the
relationship between mental health and competent decision-
making and maybe some assumptions about certain
decisions being the product of a mental illness and not
simply a companion to mental illness, as well as the value
of life worth living with bipolar diagnosis that cannot
always, despite good medication, make for a happy life.
I mean, I wonder the extent to which counsel
representing clients in death penalty litigation are
inevitably in a conflict of interest position because all of
our personal values inform our perspectives about other
people's decision-making. I'm not sure it's possible to get
away from that. I don't know how you resolve that. But I
wonder whether if we were sitting over a drink, my feelings
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about life and suicide as a reasonable solution to a set of
problems might simply be very different from yours. And
how does that affect how we represent clients?
SEAN O'BRIEN: You were looking at me while you were
asking that. And obviously, I have strong feelings about it.
But I don't think it started out as ideological or my
religious values-my faith. It comes from professional
values of my role in the system that is, I think, an
oppressive system. I really recommend that you read,
Wilbert Rideau's book that recently came out, IN THE
PLACE OF JUSTICE.4 9 Wilbert was the subject of Rideau v.
Louisiana,50 the 1963 change of venue-pre-trial publicity
case in the U.S. Supreme Court. I'm halfway through it
right now-but he's talking about his life in solitary
confinement for a period of time, how the system just
really, literally abused and raped these prisoners through
the death penalty process. If you stop and you look at the
overall context of where the client is-what has happened
to the client, what is going to happen to the client-there's
nothing that says justice about it. I'm all about justice for
the client.
You also have to recognize that a client sitting on
death row-or sitting in a county jail, pre-trial-has no idea
what the quality of life in a general population of a
humanely run penitentiary could be compared to where
they've been.
Heath Wilkins is my example. Here's a kid,
sixteen-years old, allowed to plead guilty, waive mitigation,
and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court in 1989 said
that doesn't violate the Constitution.51  And then
49 WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF JUSTICE: A STORY OF
PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE (Knopf Publishing Group 2010).
50 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
51 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (Wilkins v.
Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) was the companion case to Stanford).
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subsequently, I was appointed on the case, and he's a
volunteer from day one. Old habits die hard, don't they?
I'm not criticizing Brad at all, but it's a word I want to get
away from. He was a suicide from day one. And we are
now getting ready for a parole hearing next summer. Now
that he's in the general population, he works for a company
called Talking Tapes. He reads books onto cassettes tapes
for blind people. The quality of life is so much different
from what it had been. That's context to me.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you.
BRADLEY MACLEAN: If I could respond to that too? I
struggled with that question, and it's through my
experience that my attitude has evolved. I've had several
clients who have sought to give up their appeals to the
point of filing papers with the court on their own. Several
clients. I only have one client, though, who has maintained
that position. And that client is clearly delusional-totally
out to lunch. Every other client has changed.
And I think that there are two factors. One is as
they live, they learn that they can live life where they are.
That changes their point of view. But I think also what
changes their point of view is when they do develop a
relationship with a legal team that's willing to fight for
them, they begin to see value in living. And I think that's
our job. And it is because I've seen that, and I've never
seen a client-who is not totally delusional-who hasn't
changed his or her mind. Then you know. That has really
affected my point of view with the whole thing.
The other response that I would make is that you
read in the cases, and you read Tennessee ethical opinions,
that say you've got to allow the client to go forward.
They're based on the premise that the Eighth Amendment
52
is strictly a personal right. And I don't view the Eighth
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amendment 53 that way. I think the public has an
overriding interest in a fair and reliable process where the
sentencing decision is made in an appropriate manner. And
so, that's from a more philosophical point of view. That's
where I come out.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wanted to pose to the panel
a dilemma which I actually faced. Number one, the client
had had several lawyers---death penalty-had had several
lawyers before the case got to me. Those lawyers were
excellent, excellent lawyers. Nevertheless, the client broke
up with each one of them. I think there were five. Then I
was given the case. And I tried to get along with him. And
then I wanted to interview his family, especially his father,
who he was suspected perhaps of abusing him. But he
didn't want to talk about it. He said this, "If you interview
my father, we're through. No more cooperation. No
helping out. No nothing. It's over. So that's it. I don't
want you interviewing my father." Now, I faced the
following: five lawyers had, you know, broken up with
him-excellent lawyers. And now I was actually getting
somewhere, dealing with him, motions filing, and
discovery filing. And now he said, "If you do that, it's over
and we're through."
BRADLEY MACLEAN: I don't view that as so much of
an ethical dilemma as I do a strategic dilemma. You've got
a problem in a case like that. How do you proceed in a way
that is most effective and that's in your client's interests-
and your job-when the client is interfering? And, you
know, that to me is not an ethical problem. That to me is a
practical problem of how you handle the case. I've got a
case now where the client insists on his innocence, and he
keeps telling me that you cannot mitigate innocence.
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you talking to my family? Because I'm innocent, and you
can't mitigate innocence. I don't want to deal with any of
those issues." And that has proven to be an obstacle in our
representation. No question about that. From an ethical
point of view, my view is I do whatever I can. From a
practical point of view, I've got to take into considerations
what my client may want to do to sabotage his case.
Because he can sabotage the case, and I don't want him to
do that. So you've got to work through that. It's a
problem. No question about it.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Yeah, I agree it's a problem. And the
problem sometimes comes with its only solution. It's an
opportunity. I look at things like that as an opportunity to
ask your client, "What is it? Why? What? Are there
certain things that you want me to stay away from with
your father? Can you think of things that I could talk about
with your father?" I mean, he wants to know about what's
happening, and so what am I supposed to do? It's an
opportunity to dialogue with your client about that, but you
don't argue. You just use it to explore. And eventually,
you're going to talk to the father. And eventually, you're
going to talk to the father with your client's permission.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I dealt with the father. In
fact, we put him in a veteran's home, at the client's
suggestion. I talked to my client and tried to arrange visits.
It was getting into that early background that the client did
not want me to do. That's the dilemma.
BOB WEEKS: Thank you. I am Bob Weeks from San
Jose, California. In the response to the question, you can't
mitigate the innocence argument. One line I had some
success with. I hear that from clients as well. You know,
under some circumstances, we can put on character
evidence to prove your innocence, and there's some
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California law that says good character alone is enough to
raise a reasonable doubt. So I tried that line with some
success. So I suggest that you put that in your arsenal of
arguments to use on your clients.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you, Bob. Well, join me please
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